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1. Introduction
Fighting and adapting to climate change requires a huge  amount of resources as well as a change in agents’
behaviour. Public policy has a key role in this process – to efficiently and fairly collect resources, finance adaptation
measures and R&D investments and coordinate efforts towards new technology1. Governments may use a number
of different types of instruments to reach environmental goals and they can roughly be classified into regulatory
instruments and market‐based instruments2. They differ in several respects, such as efficacy, efficiency, impact on
prices, household welfare and economic activity. Above these economic prerogatives, political acceptability has
proven to be an essential point in order to understand why an economic instrument is effectively implemented3.
Moreover, an  often undervalued feature, strictly linked to political acceptability, can be added: the impact of
instruments on the public budget balance. Market‐based instruments, in the majority of cases, impact on the budget
balance, although with different intensity: taxes and charges always generate revenues, while tradable permits can
generate  immediate revenue only if they are auctioned by public authorities. However, all instruments have at least
an indirect impact on budget outlays or revenues: regulation in the form of standards can imply a loss of profits for
the industries affected and this can lead to a decrease in corporation tax or an increase in compensatory measures
(lump‐sum tax credits or abatement in capital tax rates). Moreover, regulation activity per se adds a cost to the
general government expenditure.
In this paper, an overview of the evidence on current environmental policy instruments that can be identified in the
Budget of EU 27 Member Countries is provided4. Unfortunately quantifying environmental revenues and subsidies is
not an easy task and the evidence is necessary incomplete. The analysis focuses on energy‐related public
expenditures and revenues, because they are directly linked to the implementation of the EU climate package,
although there are several relevant links between environmental instruments and all the other items in the public
budget.
1 The central role of public policy in promoting green technology is also stressed by growth models. See, among others,
Aghion et al. (2009).
2 For an overview of environmental instruments see Perman et al (2003).
3 See the 2006 special issue of Energy Policy on Social and political responses to ecological tax reform in Europe.
Moreover, since Buchanan and Tullock (1976), it has been widely accepted that firms prefer regulation to taxes and for this
reason politicians tend to choose command and control instruments.
4 This paper constitutes background work for the project “The Impact of Climate and Energy Policies on the Public
Budget of EU Member States” developed by Think Tank. See http://www.eui.eu/Projects/THINK/Home.aspx for further
information on the project.
After reviewing environmental revenues (section 2) and subsidies (section 3), the paper discusses the link between
the need for public resources and the current public finance situation, where Member state governments are being
forced to make significant fiscal efforts to stabilize public debt (section 4).
1. Environmental taxation and Emission Trading Scheme
Much support for market‐based instruments can be found in European policy (and in the Kyoto Protocol) as opposed
to the traditional command and control approach5. Environmental taxes and the market for emission permits are the
means of setting a price for carbon, with the aim of including all the externalities in energy prices and providing the
right signal for agents’ behaviour. While the European Carbon Trading Scheme represents a major success of recent
European policy, no comparable success has been achieved in the tax area and, despite several efforts to design a
European Carbon Tax, a supranational environmental tax is still lacking. In this field all European countries act
autonomously under the energy tax directive6, which sets minimum levels of taxation for some energy products in
order to avoid harmful fiscal competition. The following paragraphs focus on environmental and energy taxes7, the
data for which are generally readily available and comparable across countries.
From 1998 to 2004, the share of environmental taxes out of total taxation showed minor changes; afterwards the
ratio has steadily declined. As shown in graph 1, in 1999 the EU‐27 ratio was 7%and it gradually decreased to 6.1%
in 2008. However, behind this EU‐27 trend some countries experienced quite extreme movements8.
5 According to OECD (1997), economic instruments can be defined as "those policy instruments which may influence
environmental outcomes by changing the costs and benefits of alternative actions open to economic agents … economic
instruments create incentives that encourage people acting more or less in their own best interests, simultaneously, to
treat the environment in a  way that is in the best interests of society”. See also Green Paper on Market Based
Instruments, European Commission (2007).
6 Directive 2003/96/EC.
7 Eurostat uses the following definition of an environmental tax: A tax whose tax base is a physical unit (or a proxy of it)
of something that has a proven, specific negative impact on the environment (Jarass L. and G.M. Obermair 1996). Environmental
taxes are usually classified in four main groups (Energy, Transport, Resource and Pollution) according to Eurostat guidelines
(Eurostat 2001).
8 For instance, in Ireland the total environmental tax ratio out of total taxation decreased from 9,4% in 1998 to 7,9% in
2001, but it remained almost  static from 2002 to 2005 (with ratios that ranged between 8,1% and 8,3%). Estonia, on the
contrary, was characterized by a steadily rising trend from 1995 onwards, reflecting the need to adjust excise duties up to the EU
minimum rates, and specific policy implemented in order to finance cuts in personal income taxes.
Graph 1 Share of environmental tax revenues out of total taxation: the EU‐27 trend (1998‐2008)
Source: European Commission, Taxation and CustomUnit (2010)
The importance of environmental taxes varies significantly across Member States. The situation in 2008 is depicted
in graph 2. It shows relatively high ratios in the Netherlands, where  the share of revenue from environmental
taxation out of total taxation was 9.9%, and in Malta, where environmental taxes generated 10.2% of total revenue –
especially due to the high level of transport tax. The highest ratio was recorded in Denmark, which reached 11.9%,
5.8 percentage points above the EU‐27 average (6.1%).
Finland, Romania, the UK, the Slovak Republic, Luxembourg, Portugal, Estonia, Cyprus, Slovenia and Ireland formed
another group of countries with a relatively high contribution of environmental taxes to total revenue from taxes
and social contributions, all with ratios above 6.2%. Conversely, the Member States that stand below the EU‐27
average are Greece, Germany, Italy, Austria, France, Spain and Belgium. In Germany and Italy the contribution of
environmental taxes to total taxation revenues is 5.7%, while in France and Spain it remains significantly below the
EU‐27 average, at 4.9%. Belgium is the EU‐27 country with the lowest ratio (4.4%). In terms of the relationship
between environmental taxes and GDP, the findings are similar.
Graph 2 Environmental tax revenue by aggregate tax category as percentage of total taxation (2008)
Source: European Commission, Taxation and CustomUnit (2010)
In almost allMember States, a strong concentration of environmental taxes in the field of energy can be observed: in
2008, energy taxes accounted for 4.4% of total tax revenues in EU‐27 and for almost 72% of the total revenue from
environmental taxes.
2.1 Energy taxes
As shown in graph 3, Denmark and Malta are the only EU countries where energy taxes generated less than 50% of
total revenues from environmental taxes. Conversely, Luxembourg and the Slovak Republic have the highest share of
total revenues from environmental taxes (93% and 90% respectively).
Graph 3 Environmental taxes by categories in 2008
Source: Taxation and Custom Unit (2010)
Cyprus is the only EU country where revenues collected through transport taxes were close to those collected via
energy taxes, representing 50% of the environmental taxation. Significant contributions from transport taxes (more
than 30%) are observed in Austria, Denmark, Finland (due to heavy vehicle taxation), Greece, Ireland, Malta and the
Netherlands. The role of pollution taxes is marginal inmost Member States.
The aforementioned declining share of environmental taxes out of total revenue is mainly linked to a decrease in
energy taxation. Graph 4 shows that the implicit tax rate on energy (calculated as  energy taxes over energy
consumption) steadily increased, but fell in 2008.
Graph 4 Implicit tax rates9 on energy in EU 27
Source: European Commission, Taxation and CustomUnit (2010)
However, the picture changes with deflated revenues, where the implicit tax rate on energy shows a declining trend
after 2000, as revenues increased less than inflation10. This is due to the fact that energy taxes are excise taxes and a
constant nominal tax rate corresponds to a decreasing effective tax rate11.
Graph 5 illustrates the ample range of total energy implicit tax rates of member states for 2008: the implicit tax rate
in Romania represents a quarter of that prevailing in Denmark. This variation is connected to different nominal tax
rates, different energy mixes and to different tax exemption regimes.
Graph 5 Implicit tax rates on energy (2008)
Source: European Commission (2010)
9 Euros per ton of oil equivalent (TOE)
10 Implicit tax rates are computed as energy taxes in Euros per ton of oil equivalent (TOE), base year 2000. The increase in
the nominal implicit tax rate is partly reinforced by stationary energy consumption.
11 However, it is important to stress that energy taxation in these graphs does not include VAT on energy products. VAT
tax on energy increases if energy prices increase.
This high dispersion of implicit tax rates hampers  the economic effectiveness of carbon pricing. Only a sufficiently
high, homogeneous and stable policy signal would be an incentive for private R&D in new green technologies, energy
saving and emission‐reducing investments12.
A common characteristic of Member States’ energy tax policies is that energy‐related revenues are highly
concentrated on fossil products. Table 1 shows that taxes on fossil fuels are on average 90% of total energy taxation.
Exceptions are Denmark Germany and  Sweden, where taxes on electricity or nuclear power have a noticeable
importance.
Table 1
Energy taxes and fossil fuel share (2008)
Energy Taxes
Energy
Taxes/
Environm.
Taxes
Total
Mineral Natural Coal and
Oils Gas Coke Electricity Total
BE
BG
CZ
DK
DE
EE
IE
EL
ES
FR
IT
CY
LV
LT
LU
HU
MT
NL
AT(*)
PL
PT
RO
SI
SK
FI
SE
UK
63.0%
87.0%
93.0%
37.0%
82.0%
84.0%
52.0%
60.0%
80.0%
68.0%
78.0%
50.0%
85.0%
93.0%
93.0%
73.0%
43.0%
50.0%
68.0%
87.0%
73.0%
79.0%
79.0%
90.0%
65.0%
80.0%
74.0%
96.9% 1.3% 0.8% 1.1% 100.0%
98.6% 0.0% 0.3% 1.2% 100.0%
97.1% 1.2% 0.5% 1.2% 100.0%
58.1% 11.4% 4.4% 26.1% 100.0%
81.6% 4.6% 0.0% 13.8% 100.0%
91.8% 1.9% 0.0% 6.4% 100.0%
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
90.7% 0.0% 0.0% 9.3% 100.0%
99.0% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
85.4% 9.3% 0.2% 5.1% 100.0%
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
99.6% 0.0% 0.2% 0.3% 100.0%
99.8% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 100.0%
99.2% 0.5% 0.0% 0.3% 100.0%
94.7% 4.2% 0.0% 1.1% 100.0%
98.2% 0.0% 0.0% 1.8% 100.0%
64.0% 23.3% 0.1% 12.6% 100.0%
84.6% 15.4% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
89.8% 0.0% 0.0% 10.2% 100.0%
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
97.3% 1.6% 0.1% 1.0% 100.0%
98.8% 0.4% 0.0% 0.8% 100.0%
99.2% 0.4% 0.0% 0.3% 100.0%
82.3% 2.6% 1.7% 13.4% 100.0%
68.8% 1.1% 0.4% 29.8% 100.0%
97.9% 2.1% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
(*) Gas figure includes coal and electricity
Source: Eurostat Taxation Trends and European Commission Energy Duties Revenue
12 For an analysis of the effects of environmental taxation on innovation see OECD (2010).
The high share of fossil fuels reflects the idea of taxing the most damaging products13, but at the same time shows
the need to restructure the  energy tax system: if the  climate package achieves its goal, fossil fuel revenues will
decrease sharply in the next ten years.
2.1.1 Energy tax rates in EU­27
Generally speaking, tax rates on high carbon energy products are expected to be higher than those imposed on other
consumer goods in light of both revenue and environmental considerations (see Crawford, Keen and Smith, 2008).
Countries may differentiate tax levels according to estimations of local marginal damage,  revenue requirements,
concerns about income distribution and industry competitiveness. However, a high level of differentiation in energy
taxes can distort the level playing field, and so in order to reduce the incentive for tax competition (which damages
the climate change policy) a minimum of tax harmonization has been implemented in the EU.
The Energy Taxation Directive of 27 October 2003 (Directive 2003/96/EC) sets the Community approach for the
taxation of energy products. This directive widens the scope of the former EU energy taxation framework, which was
defined under the Mineral Oils Directive (Directive 1992/82/EC), extending the system of minimum rates of taxation,
previously confined to mineral oils, to coal, natural gas and electricity14. The system sets the minimum rates15 of
taxation applicable to energy products when used as motor or heating fuels and  to electricity. However, the
Directive allows Member States to differentiate between business and non‐business use of energy products and, by
way of derogation from the provisions of the directive, to continue to apply certain exemptions or reductions in the
levels of taxation (See box 1 for details). It aims to reduce  distortions that existed between Member States and
between mineral oils and other energy products which had not been previously subject to EU tax legislation, in order
to improve the operation of the internal market16.
Box 1 Minimum levels of taxation and exemptions.
The following table shows the minimum level of taxation applicable to motor fuels set by the Energy Taxation
Directive compared to the minimum levels imposed by the Mineral Oils Directive in 1992.
Minimum levels of taxation applicable to heating fuels and electricity.
Previous Minimum New Minimum Excise New Minimum Excise
13 Ideally, environmental tax rates should represent the marginal damage caused by producing or consuming a given
product. After the tax, energy prices reflect the whole cost for society (social cost). However, in practice social costs are difficult
to evaluate and tax rates respond more frequently to revenue‐raising considerations.14 The Directive is the result of a series of attempts to establish a more stringent energy taxation system in Europe. In
1997 the European Commission presented a proposal for a taxation framework on energy products (including coal and gas) and
electricity. After a long process of discussion and modifications of this proposal the EU Council finally adopted Directive
2003/96/EC.
15 In the Directive the key term “Level of taxation” refers to the total charge levied in respect of all indirect taxes (except
VAT) calculated directly or indirectly on the quantity of energy products and electricity at the time of release for consumption.
For example, in Sweden the total excise duty on mineral oil products is composed of two elements, the energy tax and the CO2
tax.
16 The effect of this framework for the taxation of energy products has been modest, because most countries already had
higher rates than the minimums. However, the minimum rates implied an increase in energy tax in all new Member States, as in
most of them only transport fuels were taxed, and at a lower rate. On this see Kouvaritakis et al. (2005).
Excise Rates Rates (business use) Rates (non‐business use)
Diesel (/1000 l.) 18 21 21
Heavy fuel oil (/1000 l.) 13 15 15
Kerosene (/1000 l.) 0 0 0
LPG (/1000 l.) 0 0 0
Natural Gas ‐ 0.15 0.3
Coal and coke ‐ 0.15 0.3
Electricity ‐ 0.5 1.0
Minimum level of taxation applicable to motor fuels.
Previous * Minimum
Excise Rates
Minimum Excise Rates
from 1.1.2004
Minimum Excise Rates
from 1.1.2010
Petrol (/1000 l.) 337 421 421
Unleaded Petrol(/1000 l.) 287 359 359
Diesel (/1000 l.) 245 302 330
Kerosene (/1000 l.) 245 302 330
LPG (/1000 l.) 100 125 125
Natural Gas 100 (/1000 kg) 2.6 (/gigajoule) 2.6 (/gigajoule)
Provided that they comply with the minimum levels, differentiated rates of taxation may be applied by Member
States, in the following cases:
• when the differentiated rates are directly linked to product quality or depend on quantitative consumption
levels (electricity and energy products used for heating purposes);
• for the following uses: local public passenger transport (including taxis), waste collection, armed forces and
public administration, disabled people, ambulances;
• between business and non‐business use, for the energy products and electricity referred to above.
Moreover, the Directive includes a number of general and Member‐specific exemptions and transitional periods. In
addition, an amendment was adopted on April 2004 by the EU’s Council of Ministers that allows the EU accession
countries to temporarily apply country‐specific excise duty exemptions or lower rates of duty17. The exemptions are
limited in time and last no longer than 2012.
The following are exempt from taxation:
• energy products and electricity used to produce electricity and electricity used to maintain the ability to
produce electricity. However, Member States may subject these products to taxation;
• energy products supplied for use as fuel for the purpose  of air navigation other than in private pleasure‐
flying;
• energy products supplied for use as fuel for the purposes of navigation within Community waters, including
fishing, other than private pleasure craft, and electricity produced on board a craft.
In addition, Member States may apply total or partial exemptions or reductions in the level of taxation to, inter alia:
• energy products used under fiscal control in the domain of pilot projects for the technological development
of more environmentally‐friendly products or in relation to fuels from renewable sources;
• biofuels (as defined in the European Directive 2003/30/EC);
• forms of energy which are of solar, wind, tidal or geothermal origin, or from biomass or waste;
• energy products and electricity used for the carriage of goods and passengers by rail, metro, tram and trolley
bus;
• energy products supplied for use as fuel for navigation on inland waterways (including fishing) other than in
private pleasure craft, and electricity produced on board a craft;
• natural gas and LPG used as propellants.
Reduced rates and exemptions from taxation applicable to Member States are set out in Annex II of the Act.
17 Directive 2004/74/EC amends the energy Directive allowing the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland,
Slovenia and Slovakia to  apply temporary exemptions or reductions in the levels of taxation. Directive 2004/75/EC amends the energy
Directive allowing Cyprus to apply temporary exemptions or reductions in the levels of taxation.
The Directive takes account of the competitiveness of businesses by providing measures to alleviate the tax burden
on energy‐intensive businesses and/or businesses that undertake   plans to achieve environmental protection
objectives or to improve energy efficiency.
It also provides that Member States may refund, fully or in part, taxes paid by producers that have invested in the
rationalization of their energy use. This refund may be as much as 100% in the case of energy‐intensive businesses,
and up to 50% for other businesses18.
The presence of minimum rates and an extensive system of exemptions has resulted in much variation in tax rates
on main energy products among member states, as is illustrated in Graphs 6 and 7 for the examples of petrol and gas
oil. Graph 6 shows the high variation in nominal rates for unleaded petrol set by countries. As of July 201019, within
the European Union countries,  the highest excise duty rate is fixed by the Netherlands at 713.99 Euros, almost
double the minimum rate (fixed at 359 Euros per 1000 litres). Conversely, Bulgaria and Romania remain below that
minimum excise duty rate, with 350.24 Euros and 348.04 Euros respectively, benefiting from a transitional period as
established by their AccessionTreaties20. On a general level, the trend in the nominal excise duty rate followed by
the EU‐27 countries between 2005 and 2010 shows a rise. Specifically, Greece experienced a remarkable increase in
its national duty rate: in the last five years it has increased by over 110%, as an instrument to reduce the high budget
imbalance. Finally, Sweden and the UK are the only countries in the EU‐27 that show mixed evidence because their
governments increased tax rates in national currency but the tax rates follow an opposite trend if we consider the
values of the excise duty rates calculated with 2004‐2009 exchange rates (National currency‐Euro)21.
Graph 6. UNLEADED PETROL: excise duty rates in the EU Member States (as at 1 July 2010).
Notes: Minimum excise duty: 359 Euros per 1000 litres. Values in Euros at 1/10/2009.
Source: European Commission, Taxation and CustomUnit (2010)
18
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market/single_market_for_goods/motor_vehicles/interactions_indus
try_policies/l27019_en.htm.
19 Data Source: European Commission (2010) “Excise duty tables‐Part II: Energy products and Electricity”
20 Some countries set different rates, depending on the sulphur content of petrol.
21 Considering the excise duty rates in National Currencies, SE increased its national duty rate (2005‐2010) from 3390 SEK
to 3810 SEK. Similarly, the UK increased its national tax rate (2005‐2010) from 501.9 GBP to 571.9 GBP on normal unleadedpetrol.
With the same minimum excise duty rate fixed at 21 Euros per 1000 litres, gas oil heating data show that almost all
European countries display similar values for both business use and non‐business use. As shown in Graph 7, the EU
Member States that have a relatively high tax rate on gas oil for business heating use are: the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Greece, Italy, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania and Slovakia. These countries have
fixed their excise duty rates above 350 Euros per 1000 litres.
Graph 7. GAS OIL– heating, business use: excise duty rates in the EU Member States (as at 1 July 2010).
Notes: Minimum excise duty: 21 EUR per 1000 litres. Values in EUR at 1/10/2009.
Source: European Commission, Taxation and CustomUnit (2010)
The gas oil trend (2005‐2010) for both business heating use and non‐business use shows that the majority of EU‐27
countries increased their nominal excise duty rates, some of them experiencing remarkable variations, as in the case
of the Netherlands (which almost quadrupled its rate) and Greece (+68% only for gas oil for non‐business heating
use).
Although excise taxes on energy are always connected to the Pigouvian framework, most countries have set – or
updated – tax rates without proper reference to  the marginal damage22, focusing on revenue raising, political
acceptance and inflation. According to the OECD’s computation23, the average real change in the tax rate on petrol
over the last decade (2000‐2010) was ‐8.1%, and for Austria, France, Spain, Italy, Hungary and the Slovak Republic a
decrease of more than  10% was recorded. On the contrary, Ireland, Portugal and Greece showed an increase of
more than 10%, but this is more to be connected to the aftermath of the financial crisis than to new estimations of
external costs.
Moreover, almost all countries use  exemptions and tax rebates for some sector or users, under the Directive
framework. The most extensive exemptions and reductions are for agriculture on motor fuel products, but generally
speaking much evidence of cross‐subsidization between users and sectors can be identified for all energy products.
22 For recent analyses of the optimal tax rate on petrol, see Lin and Prince (2009) and Parry and Small (2005).
23 See Oecd (2010).
As shown by the previous examples, it is very difficult to give a general picture of energy product tax rates set by
Member Countries, because tax rates vary with energy uses, product specificity, special concessions and, in some
countries, by region. Moreover, in some cases tax rates include CO2 taxes. In order to give a general idea of the tax
burden on energy, Table 2 shows implicit tax rates, computed as the ratio of energy product revenues to gross final
inland consumption.
Table 2
Implicit tax rates on energy products (*)
Coal and
Mineral Oils Natural Gas Coke Electricity Total
BE
BG
CZ
DK
DE
EE
IE
EL
ES
FR
IT
CY
LV
LT
LU
HU
MT
NL
AT (**)
PL
PT
RO
SI
SK
FI
SE
UK
0.16 0.003 0.007 0.006 0.081
0.21 ‐ 0.001 0.005 0.080
0.31 0.005 0.003 0.008 0.114
0.32 0.125 0.049 0.406 0.235
0.31 0.027 0.000 0.139 0.159
0.27 0.008 0.000 0.034 0.127
0.26 ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.131
0.17 ‐ 0.003 ‐ 0.117
0.18 ‐ ‐ 0.056 0.099
0.27 0.006 0.001 ‐ 0.137
0.29 0.035 0.003 0.051 0.138
0.10 ‐ ‐ 0.083
0.27 ‐ 0.006 0.002 0.117
0.16 ‐ 0.006 ‐ 0.074
0.31 0.004 ‐ 0.005 0.196
0.28 0.008 ‐ 0.008 0.096
0.09 0.009 0.074
0.21 0.076 0.002 0.152 0.130
0.29 0.044 ‐ ‐ 0.156
0.26 ‐ ‐ 0.073 0.081
0.20 0.000 ‐ ‐ 0.108
0.18 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.068
0.28 0.004 0.000 0.006 0.160
0.26 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.074
0.24 0.022 0.016 0.060 0.126
0.33 0.087 0.012 0.183 0.240
0.34 0.007 ‐ ‐ 0.118
(*) Tax Revenue in millions of euros/thousand tonnes of oil equivalent (TOE) as final inland consumption.
(**)Gas figure includes coal and electricity
Source: computation on European Commission and Eurostat data
Although these implicit tax rates are  a very rough approximation24 of the energy‐related tax policy of Member
States, a considerable variation among countries and products can be appreciated. This variation gives a description
of the tax design of Member countries (as it is linked to nominal tax rates) but at the same time it gives some hints
24 Revenue classification among categories, provided by European Commission, can conceal some heterogeneity among
member states. It is not clear, for instance, whether revenues from all levels of governments are taken into account. As regards
the  denominator, on the other hand, the  gross final inland consumption aggregate approximates the tax base for different
products differently.
on preferential treatment for some energy products. The larger the distance between nominal and implicit tax rate
rankings, the larger the use of hidden tax rebates or, more generally, tax expenditures.
Lastly, it is worth stressing that five European countries have a specific tax on the CO2 content of energy products:
Scandinavian countries introduced this special taxation in the Nineties on the basis of a Commission proposal for a
common taxation of CO2, which was never approved by the Council. Finland was the first country to adopt a carbon
tax, in 1990 (table 3). This tax applies to gas oil, diesel, light and heavy fuel oil, jet fuel, aviation gasoline, coal, and
natural gas. Although it was initially based purely on carbon content, it was later changed to a  60% carbon
component and a 40% energy component, but returned to  being a pure carbon  tax in 1997, having increased
recently to €20 per metric ton of CO2.
Table 3
Carbon taxation in the EU
Country Startingyear
Rate (€ per
CO2 tonne)
Revenue in 2008
(millions of €)
Revenue use (other than general
purpose)
Denmark 1992 12 681
Environmental protection programmes,
reduction on personal income taxation
and on social security contributions
Ireland 2009 15 250 (estimation foryear 2010)
Environment protection programmes
and grants for low‐income households
Slovenia 2007 16 30 None
Finland 1990 20.41 500 Environmental protection programmes
Sweden
(*) 1991 108 2647
Environment protection programmes,
reduction on personal income taxation
(*) Standard rate mainly for households and services; lower rates apply to industry.
Ireland, at the other extreme, introduced a new carbon tax in 2009 after a long debate as part of a general package
of fiscal consolidation. This carbon tax applied to petrol and diesel (from late 2010) and to kerosene, marked gas oil,
liquid petroleum gas (LPG), fuel oil and natural gas (from May 2010). Participants in the EU emissions trading scheme
(ETS) are exempt from the tax. As regards tax rate, four countries out of five have a tax rate that ranges between 12
and 20 Euros, not far from the carbon price that has frequently emerged from the ETS. A very different approach
was adopted by Sweden, which has recently increased the tax rate on CO2 to a level of 108 Euros, obtaining revenues
of over 2 billion. However, Swedish industry is provided with many rebates: ETS firms are completely exempt from
the CO2 tax, while firms outside the ETSwill be subject to it up to 60% of the standard rate only from 2015.
Box 2 Towards a revision of the Energy Tax Directive?
Although strongly encouraged by Delor’s White Paper, the European Union has so far shown a total inability
to set up European Carbon Taxation. In a draft proposal and through public meetings25, the European Commission
tried once again in 2009 to put carbon taxation at the top of the agenda as an additional instrument for fighting
climate change. The draft proposal analyzed different policy approaches, which ranged from simply avoiding the
negative effect of overlapping instruments (such as energy taxes and the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS)) to the
introduction of “an additional uniform CO2‐related tax on top of taxes already existing under the European EnergyDirective to complement EU‐ETS”(p.5). As a new common tax appears politically unfeasible, the Commission has
25 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2009). For a comment linked to the proposal see LAURENT ,LE CACHEX (2009)
recently  set a new  plan26 to amend the common  energy taxation policy in order to tax energy products with
reference to climate change emissions, in addition to their energy content. At the same time the revision would
exempt all sectors involved in the Emission Trading Scheme and abolish tax concessions for some sectors.
Compared to the existing Directive, it would provide important environmental tax incentives:
‐ minimum levels of taxation (€20 per tonne of CO2 emitted) on different types of fuels linked to the intensity of theiremissions, to be effective from 2013.
‐ a changed tax base from the metric unit of 1000 litres to the energy unit of Gigajoule, thereby relating it to the
calorific (= energy content) content of each fuel.
‐ the exclusion from the scope of the Energy Taxation Directive of CO2‐related taxation of products that are biomassor are made from biomass27.
‐ tax credit concerning CO2 taxation for sectors exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage.
‐ the alignment of tax rates at regular intervals to take into account the evolution of their real values.
2.2 Public Revenues and the Emission Trading Scheme
2.2.1 Revenue from auctioning
The European Emission Trading Scheme, introduced in 2003, is a cap and trade system set up to limit greenhouse
emissions emitted by large industrial28 installations in the EU. After a period of “learning by doing”, the market
entered into force  in 2008 together with the Kyoto protocol: Member State Governments set a cap on total
emissions and then distributed allowances to the firms in the scheme (mainly for free); these  allowances can be
traded without restraint between market participants but at the end of the year firms are required to have enough
allowances to offset their emissions; consequently a carbon price that clears the market emerges as a device to
match demand with the fixed supply of allowances. After the end of the Kyoto protocol (December 2012), the ETS
scheme will run into a third phase in which  the range of economic activities29 will be expanded and the
grandfathering allocation will be replaced by auctioning. Although on economic efficiency grounds there is no
difference between allocation by auction or grandfathering (provided that no market imperfections exist), the two
options have different impacts on the budget: grandfathering of permits does not satisfy the ‘polluter pays’ principle
and represents a transfer from society to polluters in the form of foregone revenues. This is the reason why a switch
toward auctioning has been decided for the third phase.
Although grandfathering is the general rule in phase 2, Member States are permitted to auction up to 10% of their
allowances. However, only a few Member States (Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK), have made use of
this possibility so far, although Germany and the UK have auctioned significant amounts.
26 See European Commission (2011).
27 http://www.euractiv.com/pdf/Energy%20Taxation%20Interservice%20proposal.pdf
28 Not all economic sectors are involved in the scheme. Only energy activities, production and processing of ferrous
metals, mineral industries and pulp and paper industries are included at the moment.
29 Other important features of the ETS revision are the inclusion of additional greenhouse gases and the centralized and
harmonized allocation methodologies. See Directive 2009/29/EC.
Table 4
Estimated revenue from auctioning
Country Annual quantity to be auctioned in phase II. Levels and % of
national allotment
Austria 400,000 ‐ 1.3%
Germany 40 million ‐ 9%
Netherlands 3.2 million – 3.7%
UK 17 million ‐ 7%
Deutsche Bank (2010)
The UK will auction 7 percent of its allowances during the second phase – approximately 17 million annually, making
a total of 85 million between 2008 and 2012. The public revenues resulting from the auctioning process obviously
depend on prices: in its first Phase II auction (November 2008), four million allowances were distributed at a clearing
price of €16.15 (£13.60), raising £54 million30.
2.2.2 Tax treatment of Emission Trading Permits
The general aim of the European Emission Trading Scheme is to reduce and level the abatement costs of greenhouse
gasses. For a tax system to be neutral, tax details must have no effect on the location of abatement and no arbitrage
opportunities should arise. Therefore,  a disparity of tax treatments among European countries could affect the
efficiency of the trading scheme (making abatement efforts more costly than otherwise) and at the same time could
open opportunities for tax planning and arbitrage, with severe revenue losses for many Member States. Evidence of
this tax planning opportunity is the  widespread VAT fraud (known as the Carousel fraud) recently discovered by
several Member States, which resulted in a suspension of the ordinary VAT regime on emission allowances.
The mere existence and the  trading of emission allowances gives rise to direct and indirect tax issues. Emission
allowances are created by regulatory authorities as free allocations or as the result of an auction process; these
allowances give the  holder the  right to emit a ton of carbon and must be returned to the  national authority in
proportion to effective carbon dioxide emissions. As a consequence, the price can vary from zero (if there is a free
allocation) to a market‐determined price, but their value can change during the reference period if carbon market
conditions change. Moreover, emission allowances can then be traded between market participants (as some firms
will need to buy additional permits, while low abatement cost firms will be able to sell). A preliminary problem that
can influence direct and indirect taxation is the classification of the allowances – establishing if a carbon permit is to
be considered a commodity, a financial service, an intangible asset or an item that can be put in the inventory.
Classification as an intangible or tangible asset may also influence the result.
30 Total revenue has been estimated at more than 1 billion.
As regards indirect taxation, the original transfer of allowances – as a general rule – is not subject to VAT. In the case
of free allocation no VAT is due because the price is zero, whereas if an auction takes place the allocation is not
under the VAT regime because it is performed by a Public Body. However, recent sentences from the European
Court of Justice have ruled that states and public bodies must be subject to VAT in respect of any transactions or
activities they are engaged in unless they can demonstrate that these transactions or activities does not create, or
are not likely to create, a significant distortion of competition31. This will probably imply that VATwill be charged on
future CO2 permit auctions.
Subsequent transfers of allowances between taxable persons are considered a supply of service and are taxable at
the place where the recipient is established. However, during the summer of 2009 a number of cases of suspected
fraud were detected and this urged the European Commission32and Member States to take measures, including the
application of a reverse charge system33 (Ireland and the Netherlands), the removal of permits from the VAT regime
(France) and the application of a zero rate to these transaction  (the UK). Poland decided to classify allowances as
financial services, in this way removing their trading from the VAT regime.
Selling and buying emission  permits generates revenues and costs in firms’ balance sheets and thus affects
corporation tax. As previously discussed, the categorization of allowances chosen leads to different tax treatment
implications: in the case of  classification as a commodity, the allowances will be considered as costs when
purchased, and as a taxable income when sold34. If carbon permits are treated as intangible assets, they enter into
balance sheet activities but their cost is handled by the general depreciation mechanism, with a fraction of the total
cost becoming deductable in each accounting period. Lastly, if allowances are considered financial assets, the tax
details depend on the final motivation of the investment (whether it is a pure financial investment or an investment
to meet an obligation,  if the investment is performed by a financial firm etc.). In order to avoid arbitrage
opportunities and fraud, a harmonization  of tax principles regarding carbon allowances is urgently needed. This
coordination, which like all tax‐related policies in the EU will be complicated, appears a key step for the progress of
the carbon market.
3.Energy­related subsidies
3.1 Defining the issue
In spite of its importance in the public debate and political agenda, there is not yet a common and shared
definition of what a “subsidy” is, regardless of the sector considered. Nonetheless, the common point of view used
31 See for instance ECJ Case c‐288/07, 16th September 2008 and COMMISSION Vs IRELAND, Case C‐544/07.
32 See the Directive 2010/23/EU of 16 March 2010, amending the "VAT Directive" by introducing an optional and
temporary application of the reverse charge mechanism in relation to supplies of certain services susceptible to fraud.
33 The reverse charge mechanism is a system where the obligation to pay VAT is shifted from the supplier to the buyer of
a product/service. This system, already in place for cross‐border trade in carbon credits, is extended to domestic transactions.
34 For an analysis of implication on corporate taxation in EU, see DGTAXUD (2010).
in the various attempts35 to define the issue is that  the scope of the definition should include not only the direct
financial transfer that the general government makes to producers or consumers, but it should also be extended to
cover both those actions directly undertaken by the general government for the energy sector36 and  all those
measures which support it without an explicit public outlay37. Furthermore, some studies38 have asserted that for the
energy sector in particular, other aspects like the limitation of civil liability for nuclear accidents and a lack of
measures that impose external costs to producers should be taken into account. The various types of government
interventions possible are summarized in the following table, which also shows how the subsidy usually works:
Table 5
Types of energy subsidy and their effects on production costs and consumer prices
How the subsidy usuallyworks
Government
intervention Examples
Lowers cost
of
production
Raises
price to
producer
Lowers
price to
consumer
Direct financial
transfer
Grants to producer
Grants to consumers
Low interest or
preferential loans
x
x
x
Preferential tax
treatment
Rebates or exemption
on royalties, sales
taxes, producer levies
and tariffs
Tax credit
Accelerated
depreciation
allowances on
equipment
x
x
x
x
Trade restrictions Quotas, technicalrestrictions and trade
embargoes
x
Energy‐related
services provided
directly by
governments at less
than full cost
Direct investment in
energy infrastructure
Public R&D
Liability insurance and
facility
decommissioning costs
x
x
x
Regulation of the
energy sector
Demand guarantees
and mandated
deployment
Price controls
Market‐access
restrictions
x x
x
x
x
Source: UNEP (2008), “Reforming Energy Subsidies”
35 See for instance: IEA (International Energy Agency) 2006, “Carros and Sticks: Taxing and Subsidising Energy”, Note on
Energy Subsidies and Taxes, 17 January 2006; EIA (Energy Information Administration) 1992, “Federal energy subsidies: direct
and indirect interventions in energy markets”, EIA Service Report, US Department of Energy, Washington, DC; “WTO Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures”, art.1
36 For example, public R&D on energy technologies or public intervention in building energy‐specific facilities like dams
and pipelines.
37 For example, tax expenditures or market regulation.
38 EEA (2004)and EIA (2010) ”
On the basis of this classification, subsidies can be classified as:
on‐budget subsidies, which include measures which appear as outlays in the general government balance sheet, like
direct financial transfers or appropriations for energy‐related services directly undertaken by the government;
off‐budget subsidies, which include those measures not featuring in the balance‐sheet, like the provision of tax
expenditures or benefits originating from market regulation.
Because of the difficulties in quantifying the value of some of the items above and the lack of comparable data for
the EU‐27 countries, only on‐budget subsidies can be estimated by analyzing national accounts. Some data on tax
expenditures as an example of off‐budget subsidies will follow39.
3.1.1 On­budget40
For on‐budgetmeasures, the estimation of subsidies is based on Eurostat’s General government expenditure
by function, where a distinction between “Direct financial transfers” and “Energy‐related services provided directly”
is made. This breakdown refers to the budget expenditure for all the activities in the energy sector except for R&D,
which is shown in a separate row.
Table 6 shows that in 2008, the total appropriations for the energy sector in EU‐27 amounted to about 13.5 billion
Euros, one quarter of which was earmarked for R&D activities. A common feature is that countries prefer the use of
direct financial transfers rather than directly providing energy‐related services to support the energy sector. The
scale of country stimulus only in part reflects the size of the economy, as it is linked more to country‐specific energy
source endowments: the absence of energy resources reduces the level of support in large economies like Italy. Data
for R&D appropriations show (except for the UK) a higher correlation with the size of the economy, especially for the
largest countries, which actually account for about 90% of the EU‐27 expenditure on energy sector R&D.
39 The lack of official and comprehensive data on public subsidies to the energy sector is underlined by all the
international institutions dealing with environmental and energy issues. The most recent data  for European Member States’
energy‐related subsidies has been estimated for 2001 (EEA (2004). See also IEA et al. (2010) and Unep (2008) for a global
analysis of the issue.
40 From “General government expenditure by function”, the entries 'Subsidies' (D.3) and 'Capital Transfers' (D.9) have been used
to estimate direct financial transfers by general government, while the entries 'Intermediate Consumption' (P.2), 'Gross Capital
Formation' (P.5) and 'Compensation of Employees' (D.1) have been utilized to estimate appropriations by general government
for undertaking energy‐related services. For each of the entries above, only the (second level) entry 'Fuel and energy' (04.3) of
Economic Affairs (04) has been   taken into account. R&D expenditure comes from the dataset “Government Budget
Appropriations or Outlays on R&D” (gba_nabsfin07), entry 'Energy' (05) of the NABS (Nomenclature for the Analysis and
Comparison of Scientific programmes and Budget).
Table 6
Energy‐related expenditure, 2008 (data inmillions of euro and as % of GDP)
Kind of General
Government intervention
(excluding R&D sector)
Direct
financial
transfer
Energy‐
related
services
provided
directly
Subtotal
by
Country
General
Government
energy‐
related R&D
appropriations
Total in
millions of
Euro
Total as a
% of GDP
BE 451.8 95.5 547.3 36.3 583.6 0.2
BG 7.8 9.2 17.0 10.0 27.0 0.1
CZ 72.1 96.8 168.9 23.4 192.3 0.1
DK 4.0 18.1 22.1 77.9 100.0 0.0
DE 2850.0 270.0 3120.0 727.4 3847.4 0.2
EE 57.5 5.0 62.5 3.3 65.8 0.4
IE 0.0 319.6 319.6 28.1 347.7 0.2
EL 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.6 13.6 0.0
ES 828.0 208.0 1036.0 456.8 1492.8 0.1
FR 952.2 324.0 1276.2 855.2 2131.4 0.1
IT 131.0 142.0 273.0 589.3 862.3 0.1
CY 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0
LV 6.2 42.5 48.7 3.4 52.1 0.2
LT 9.4 44.7 54.1 0.6 54.7 0.2
LU 21.7 46.2 67.9 5.4 73.3 0.2
HU 0.0 7.8 7.8 9.4 17.2 0.0
MT 57.3 0.0 57.3 0.0 57.3 1.0
NL 296.0 276.4 572.3 112.6 685.0 0.1
AT 42.3 1.3 43.6 18.1 61.7 0.0
PL 248.6 76.6 325.2 25.4 350.6 0.1
PT 466.6 36.2 502.8 20.7 523.5 0.3
RO 125.0 75.5 200.5 41.0 241.6 0.2
SI 4.1 12.2 16.3 2.1 18.4 0.0
SK 113.5 18.1 131.6 3.7 135.4 0.2
FI 36.0 7.0 43.0 159.5 202.5 0.1
SE 75.8 199.9 275.7 94.2 369.9 0.1
UK 648.0 373.0 1021.0 87.5 1108.5 0.1
Country
(2008)
EU‐27 7504.9 2706.1 10211.0 3405.1 13616.1 0.1
Source: Author’s calculation on Eurostat data
The share of overall on‐budget energy‐related expenditure out of GDP is shown in the graph below; it is evident that
the weight is not sizeable, being in every country around 0.2 percent of GDP, and around a half percentage  point of
Total Expenditure.
Box 3
Public R&D expenditure inGermany and the Czech Republic
A leading role in energy‐related R&D expenditure is taken by Germany. Total R&D expenditure in this area amounts
to 500 million Euros, of which the greatest share is devoted to Nuclear (Fusion and Fission) and to Renewable energy
sources.
Among renewables, the sector supported most is R&D for solar, thermal and photovoltaic energy, while a sharp
reduction in R&D for water, wind and wave energy can be noticed, simultaneously with an overall increase in funds
earmarked for R&D in renewable sources.
Germany (millions of euro) Year
NABS 92 Classification 2006 2005 2004 2001 2000
29.1 25.9 23.1 27.1 33.8General research into production, distribution, andrational utilization of energy
Fossil fuels and their derivatives 23.2 19.9 14.2 16.0 25.9
Nuclear fission 116.6 117.5 122.1 126.3 144.4
5.7 7.9 6.7 11.1 15.3Radioactive waste management includingdecommissioning with regard to fuel energy
Nuclear fusion 127.6 134.8 134.1 120.9 153.0
Renewable energy sources 135.8 102.4 99.1 147.1 143.6
Solar thermal and photovoltaic energy 116.6 78.1 78.4 103.7 118.1
Geothermal energy 6.1 3.8 3.5 12.4 2.4
Water, wind and wave energy 2.1 4.1 3.8 22.5 18.0
11.0 16.4 13.3 8.5 5.1
Research into biomass conversion
(particularly into the areas of pyrolysis,
gasification, extraction and enzyme
processing); research into the
processing of waste from industry,
agriculture and the domestic sector with
a view to energy production
Rational utilization of energy 76.7 82.1 74.5 64.1 34.9
Other research into production, distribution and rational
utilization of energy 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.7 5.6
Source: Eurostat
Total 514.7 490.6 473.9 513.2 556.3
Czech Republic: Even though the weight of appropriations for the renewable sector decreased (from about 20% to
16%), the level of support was still high in 2006, like in Germany, but the composition is completely different as the
largest part is represented by research into biomass conversion; great importance is also given to geothermal energy
research, which was the major recipient of the increased overall level of support in 2006, more than compensating
for the loss deriving from the phase out of expenditure on research into water, wind and wave energy.
Czech Republic (millions of euro) Year
NABS 92 Classification 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002
General research into production, distribution,
and rational utilization of energy 1.3 1.4 0.4 0.0 0.0
Fossil fuels and their derivatives 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2
Nuclear fission 4.3 3.5 2.6 1.7 1.6
Radioactive waste management including
decommissioning with regard to fuel energy 1.3 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.0
Nuclear fusion 2.4 2.2 1.6 0.1 0.3
Renewable energy sources 2.6 1.6 1.9 1.7 1.4
Solar thermal and photovoltaic energy 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.6 :
Geothermal energy 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 :
Water, wind and wave energy 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 :
Research into biomass conversion
(particularly into the areas of pyrolysis,
gasification, extraction and enzyme
processing); research into the processing of
waste from industry, agriculture and the
domestic sector with a view to energy
production
1.3 0.9 0.9 0.9 :
Rational utilization of energy 3.3 2.6 1.3 1.8 1.4
Other research into production, distribution and
rational utilization of energy 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.8 1.4
Total 15.5 13.2 9.4 7.4 7.3
Production, distribution and rational utilization of
energy 15.6 13.3 9.4 7.4 7.3
Data in millions of Euro
Source: Eurostat
78.0 2.4 12.2 7.3
10627.2 332.1 1660.5 996.3
9254.2 289.2 1446.0 867.6
8522.0 266.3 1331.6 798.9
8987.1 280.8 1404.2 842.5
9347.6 292.1 1460.6 876.3
Total on‐budget
amount
13616.1
11856.9
10918.8
11514.8
The dataset we chose does not allow us to identify the specific energy sector the support is addressed to (i.e. coal,
oil, nuclear or renewable). In order to estimate these quotas, it is necessary to rely on findings from other studies.
The European Environment Agency technical report “Energy Subsidies in the European Union: a brief overview”
dealt with the same issue in 2004 and estimated on‐budget and off‐budget subsidies to the energy sector in EU‐15
for each  energy source41. Starting from EEA’s estimated quotas, total subsidies can be allocated among energy
sources as shown in Table 7. This evaluation would set the level of public support for solid fuels (mainly coal) at an
average value of 9.5 billion Euros, while the oil and gas sector would not reach the threshold of 0.3 billion; the
outlays for the nuclear field would amount (on average) to 1.5 billion and, lastly, those addressed toward renewable
sources would be a little less than 1 billion (876 million Euros). Given the remarkable expansion of renewable energy
industries – and the generous support they received in some countries in the last decade – these figures should only
be considered a very rough starting point.
Table 7 ‐ Simulation of on‐budget support for different kinds of fuel (millions of Euros)
Kind of Fuel1
Solid fuel Oil and gas Nuclear Renewables
%
2008
2007
2006Ye
ar
2005
Average
1 Electricity subsidies allocated to fuels on the basis of generation inputs
Source: EEA
41 EEA estimation refers to 2001. Even though the two aggregates are broadly defined in the same way, the dataset, the
panel of countries and the methodology are quite different.
3.1.2 Off­budget
Among off‐budget subsidies, the reduction of VAT rates on energy products has considerable importance. Several
European countries have set a reduced rate of VAT on the consumption of energy products. The difference between
the standard rate and the special rate applied for some specific use and user (mainly household and agriculture)
gives the magnitude of the implicit subsidy, shown  in the table below by country and type. This kind of tax
expenditure is widely employed in Ireland, Portugal,  Luxembourg and the UK, and is limited to one product
elsewhere (Spain, Belgium and Italy).
Table 8
Reduced VAT rate on energy products in the EU
Country Energy product Use User
Special
VAT
Rate
Standard
VAT rate
(2011)
Belgium Coal and Coke All 12.00% 21.00%
Greece Natural Gas
Electricity
All
All
11.00%
11.00%
23.00%
Spain Petrol All 16.00% 18.00%
Ireland GasOil
Kerosene
Heavy fuel oil
GPL
Natural Gas
Coal and Coke
Electricity
All but propellant
Propellant
All but propellant
All
All but propellant
All but propellant
All
All
Motor fuel for agricultural purposes
Agriculture, horticulture, pisciculture, forestry
Railways
13.50%
13.50%
13.50%
13.50%
13.50%
13.50%
13.50%
13.50%
13.50%
13.50%
21.00%
Italy Natural Gas Heating Non business & up to 480 m3 10.00% 20.00%
Cyprus GPL All 5.00% 15.00%
Luxembourg GasOil
GPL
Natural Gas
Coal and Coke
Electricity
Heating
All
All
All
All
All 12.00%
6.00%
6.00%
12.00%
6.00%
15.00%
Portugal GasOil
Kerosene
Heavy fuel oil
Natural Gas
Electricity
All but propellant
Propellant
Heating
All
All
All
Motor fuel for agricultural purpose
Agriculture, horticulture, pisciculture, forestry
Railways
All
13.00%
13.00%
13.00%
13.00%
13.00%
13.00%
6.00%
6.00%
23.00%
United
Kingdom GasOil
Kerosene
Heavy fuel oil
GPL
Natural Gas
Coal and Coke
Electricity
Heating
Heating
Heating
Heating
Heating
Heating
All
Domestic use & less than 2300 litre deliveries
Domestic use & less than 2300 litre deliveries
Domestic use & less than 2300 litre deliveries
Domestic use & less than 2300 litre deliveries
Domestic use & less than 2300 litre deliveries
Non business
Non business
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
5.00%
20.00%
For an estimation of the budget impact of this kind of tax expenditure, product prices, tax rate abatement and
consumption by use and users should be taken into account.
Table 9 summarizes a recent study on VAT tax expenditure by IEEP for 2004, in which gas and other fuels are
considered.
Table 9 ‐ Implicit subsidies for household consumption by reduced VAT rates (data in millions of Euros, 2004)
Country\Consumption Solid fuels Fuel oil Natural gas Electricity Total byCountry
Belgium 6.7 6.7
Estonia 0.5 0.5
Greece 4.3 239.0 243.3
Hungary 1.2 1.2
Ireland 11.5 30.6 52.9 152.1 247.1
Italy 0.3 114.2 1532.9 1647.4
Luxembourg 2.7 12.5 25.9 41.1
Malta 10.5 10.5
Portugal 26.5 39.0 556.7 622.2
United Kingdom 45.3 54.4 1907.8 2491.6 4499.1
EU‐25 total 65.5 114.2 2130.7 5008.7
Source: IEEP (2007)
Among subsidies to households, it is clear that the largest part is granted to the electricity and gas sector (almost
98% of the total). Moreover, it is worth stressing that these figures appear much bigger than the on‐budget
subsidies.
BOX 4 ‐ Biofuel subsidies
Following the long experience of biofuel use and promotion in Member States, the EU Commission started a biofuels policy in the
Eighties42, when the role of biofuels in reducing Member States’ dependence on oil imports was highlighted. Since then the
reduction of energy dependence has been linked to the promotion of European Agriculture and the biofuels sector was also
supported through the Common Agricultural Policy.
The first – but unlucky ‐ example of the use of tax instruments in this area was the proposal known as the Scrivener Directive
(1992), where the exemption of liquid biofuels from fuel excise taxes was recommended. Although the Scrivener proposal did not
become a Directive, it influenced Member States’ national policies: from the early Nineties, France, Austria, Germany, Italy and
almost all other MSs introduced some form of tax exemption or reduction43. After the EU signed the Kyoto protocol, a series of
White Papers called for an increase in biofuel importance and a Directive of 2003 set reference values for the proportions of
biofuels in petrol and diesel44, while Directive 2009/28 increased the target to 10%. Thus, this quota system requires the use of
biofuels for a given fraction of the road transport fuel mix and the possible increase in costs is shifted to consumers. As shown by
the table below, several Member States employ quota obligations, tax credits or excise reductions45.
Overview of main biofuel support instruments in the EU‐27
42 Directive 85/536/EEC of 5 December 1985 on crude oil savings
43 Although almost all Member countries have employed tax rebates for biofuels, there is a huge variation in the intensity
of this kind of subsidy and in the definition of eligibility. Moreover, France and Italy have introduced a ceiling to the amount of
biofuel that can qualify for tax exemption in order to limit the budget expenditure.
44 The reference value was set at 5.75 percent market share (in energy content) of all petrol and diesel for transport
purposes by 31 December 2010. Directive EC 2003/30
45 Almost all Member  countries have employed some tax rebates for biofuels, but there is a huge variation in these
subsidies.
Source: Ecofys (2011)
For 2006, GSI estimated biofuel support at more than 10 billion dollars for the main developed countries, of which more than 4
billion are estimated for the EuropeanUnion.
Provisional total support estimates (TSE) for ethanol and biodiesel in selected OECD countries in 2006
The importance of subsidies and tax exemption in biofuel development can be highlighted by the anti‐dumping duty
that the EU has imposed on biofuel imports from the USA46.
It is even more complicated to consider “hidden subsidies” in the form of tariffs paid by consumers (feed‐in tariffs).
In this case, the level of tariffs does not reflect the actual cost of energy, because it includes a burden imposed upon
consumers, mainly devoted to financing renewable sources. This is not very different from a tax, but nonetheless this
46 See COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 193/2009 and 599/2009.
money does not feature in the public budget. Therefore, despite their importance from an economic point of view
and for any analysis of the redistributive impact, feed‐in tariffs are not included in this study.
4. Is there any room for environmental fiscal reform?
4.1 A snapshot of the budgetary fragility in the EU­27
The recent financial crisis caused a serious economic downturn, which is still in play. This situation, heightened by
doubts about the solvency of the Greek and Irish Governments and their ability to repay their outstanding sovereign
debt, put pressure on bond markets  and public finances throughout the European Union. The resulting general
worsening of Government budgets led to a situation in which almost all Member States (except Estonia, Luxembourg
and Sweden) are under the EDP (Excessive Deficit Procedure) of the European Commission. As shown in the first
column in Table 10, the budget imbalance exceeds 3% of GDP in almost all cases. The short‐term fiscal efforts (i.e.
improvement in the budget balance) and deadlines required of each Country to comply with the 3% threshold are
shown in the following columns of the table. For at least five countries (Ireland, Greece, Latvia Lithuania and
presumably the UK) the fiscal effort required reaches two percentage points of GDP within the next three years.
Looking at the long run, it can be noted that without fiscal consolidation the path of debt could lead to an explosive
situation in 2060 (for almost all countries) and therefore the primary surplus 47 required to consolidate and stabilize
the debt‐to‐GDP ratio is generally sizable: revenues must permanently exceed expenditures net of interest for an
amount greater than 10% of GDP for Greece, Spain, the UK and Ireland (as shown by indicator S2, which includes an
age‐related expenditure forecast). Based on the current level of debt, projections of the 2060 debt‐to‐GDP ratio and
the long‐term fiscal consolidation requirements, the European Commission assesses the budgetary risk of countries
on a three‐level scale (High, Medium, Low). As shown by “Overall risk assessment” in table 10, only 5 countries (out
of 27) achieved a good assessment with a low fragility risk.
47 The “primary balance” does not take into account interest payments on outstanding debt, and “structural” means that
the balance has been adjusted to not be affected by the business cycle and by “one‐off” and “temporary” measures.
Table 10
Long term indicators of budget balances in the EU48
General
Government
balance
ratio (% of
GDP)
Fiscal effort (on General Government
balance ratio)
Debt ratio
(% of GDP)
Debt ratio
projections
on
unchanged
policy
relative to
2009 (% of
GDP)
Required
structural
primary
balance
permanent
adjustment
(% of
GDP)
Government
Revenue (%
of GDP)
2010
Annual
Average
(% of
GDP)
Starting
year Deadline 2010 2060 S2
Overall risk
assessment
2009
CZ ‐5.2 1 2010 2013 40.0 486.7 7.4 high 40.3
IE ‐3.3 1,9 2011 2015 97.4 848.5 1.0 high 34.1
EL ‐9.6 >2 2010 2014 140.2 884.0 1.1 high 36.9
ES ‐9.3 >1.5 2010 2013 64.4 766.6 1.,8 high 34.7
CY ‐5.9 > or = 1.5 2011 2012 62.2 335.5 8.8 high 40.3
LV ‐7.7 > or = 2.75 2010 2012 45.7 898.1 9.9 high 34.0
LT ‐8.4 > or = 2.25 2010 2012 37.4 545.9 7.1 high 34.1
MT ‐4.2 0.75 2011 2011 70.4 432.5 7.0 high 40.5
NL ‐5.8 0.75 2011 2013 64.8 450.3 6.9 high 46.3
RO ‐7.3 1.75 2010 2012 30.4 633.8 9.1 high 32.1
SI ‐5.8 0.75 2010 2013 40.7 831.6 1.2 high 44.4
SK ‐8.2 1 2010 2013 42.1 561.2 7.4 high 34.0
UK ‐1.5 1.75 2010/2011 2014/2015 77.8 759.2 1.4 high 40.2
BE ‐4.8 0.75 2010 2012 98.6 372.4 5.3 medium 48.2
DE ‐3.7 > or = 0.5 2011 2013 75.7 318.9 4.2 medium 44.3
FR ‐7.7 >1 2010 2013 83.0 431.3 5.6 medium 48.1
IT ‐5.0 > or = 0.5 2010 2012 118.9 205.9 1.4 medium 46.6
LU ‐1.8 18.2 437.5 12.5 medium 41.6
HU ‐3.8 > or = 0.25 2010 2011 78.5 ‐26.3 ‐0.1 medium 45.8
AT ‐4.3 0.75 2011 2013 70.4 337.8 4.7 medium 48.3
PL ‐7.9 > or = 1.25 2010 2012 55.5 318.4 3.2 medium 37.4
PT ‐7.3 1.25 2010 2013 82.8 389.9 5.5 medium 41.6
BG ‐3.8 > or = 0.75 2011 2011 18.2 9.8 0.9 low 36.9
DK ‐5.1 > or = 0.5 2011 2013 44.9 18.3 ‐0.2 low 55.8
EE ‐1.0 8.0 81.4 1.0 low 43.6
FI ‐3.1 > or = 0.5 2011 2011 49.0 248.7 4.0 low 53.2
SE ‐0.9 39.9 93.1 1.8 low 55.7
Source: European Commission
As fiscal consolidation will require large adjustments in fiscal balances, its growth effect is a big concern, particularly
for the short run. Should fiscal consolidation be sustained by an increase in taxation or an expenditure cut? How
much space is left for the 2020 strategy? In other words, the question is to what extent the achievement of climate
change‐related goals can help or hamper fiscal consolidation. The last column of Table 10 shows the ratio of total
48 The table is based on several European Commission documents: “Council recommendation to end the excessive deficit
situation”, “European Economic Forecast Autumn 2010”, “Sustainability report 2009“, “Public finance in EMU 2010”.
taxation to GDP, as an indicator (for the revenue side) of the residual room for manoeuvre. It can be seen that the
“high‐risk” countries (except for Slovenia and The Netherlands) have lower ratios compared to the “medium” and
(especially) the “lower‐risk” Countries.
4.2 Tax ratios and tax composition
As a very general finding, tax ratios show that countries with high risk assessment tend to have a lower tax burden,
while the reverse seems true for low risk countries. However, is very difficult to design a general recipe for fiscal
instruments and a reference point for general tax ratios. In the last decade new member countries adopted fiscal
reforms aimed at boosting efficiency and growth, setting very low progressivity for income tax; as a consequence a
space is left for future tax increases, including environment‐related revenue. The same can be said for Ireland, which
in the last two decades has been characterized by the lowest corporation tax rate among EU countries but
introduced, as a first policy reaction to the financial crisis, a CO2 tax.
Some useful insights can be drawn from tax composition and, most importantly, implicit tax rates. Table 11 shows
that the tax burden and implicit tax rates usually increase with healthy public finances.
Table 11
Average tax share and implicit tax rates according to risk assessment
Indirect Taxes Direct Taxes
Risk
Assessme
nt
Over
all
Tax
Ratio
Indirect
Taxes ‐ VAT ‐ Energy Taxes
% of % of % of
total total Implicit on total Implicit
taxes taxes consumption taxes tax rates
Direct - Personal
Taxes Income - Corporate
% of % of % of
total total Implicit total Implicit tax
taxes taxes labour taxes rate
High
Medium
Low
37.8
44.7
49.0
38.1 22.6 19.5 5.0 144.2
35.5 18.4 21.4 4.7 171.3
40.0 24.0 26.8 5.7 175.3
31.3 18.0 30.6 11.0 19.5
31.2 21.6 38.2 7.7 21.4
37.3 28.4 36.2 7.3 26.8
Source: Computation on Taxation Trends (2010)
The relative importance  of VAT is quite similar among Member States, thanks to the harmonized regime that set
homogenous tax bases and minimum tax levels. Despite this harmonization, however, implicit tax rates increase with
financial robustness.
Moreover, implicit tax rates on energy highlight a considerable distance between medium and low risk countries and
high risk members, even though the smallest share of energy taxes out of total taxation is shown by medium risk
countries.
4.3 The expenditure side of the budget: general structure
In the current total expenditures structure, there is no correlation between present public finance fragility – as
defined by the European Commission and the Stability Pact – and the extension of the welfare state. Table 12
provides a breakdown of government expenditure, where expenditures are aggregated into six categories according
to the Classification of the Functions of Government, or COFOG49: general public services; defence, public order and
safety; economic affairs; environmental protection; housing, recreation, culture, and religion; education, health and
social protection. There is a fair degree of variation in what countries prioritize, as the table shows. General public
services and defence and public order amount on average to 20% of total  expenditure. The “Economic Affairs”
function (which includes the previously analyzed energy‐related subsidies) amounts on average to 11%.
Public expenditure is mainly devoted – on average 61% – to those sectors (namely “Health”, “Education” and “Social
Protection”) characterizing the “Welfare‐State”; furthermore, disaggregated data suggest that one third of this kind
of expenditure is related to “Old Age” protection (mainly pensions), while the share of unemployment benefits out
of total expenditures comes to 2%. Denmark, at the upper end, allocates more than 70 percent of its government
spending  to social protection, while Germany, Sweden, France, Luxembourg and Finland spend more than 65
percent.
Table 12
General government expenditure by function (% of total expenditure) according to risk assessment – 2008
Risk Assesment
01 (General
public
services)
02
(Defence)
+ 03
(Public
order
and
safety)
04
(Economic
affairs)
05
(Environmental
protection)
06 (Housing
and
community
amenities) +
08
(Recreation,
culture and
religion)
07 (Health)
+ 09
(Education)
+
10 (Social
protection)
10.02
(Old
Age)
10.05
(Unemployment)
Total
Expenditure
by country
High 12.6 8.1 13.3 2.0 5.5 58.4 16.2 1.7 100.00
Medium 14.7 5.9 9.6 1.5 4.2 64.2 22.3 2.5 100.00
Low 12.0 7.7 10.0 1.4 4.9 64.0 19.7 2.6 100.00
Unweighted Average 13.2 7.3 11.5 1.7 4.9 61.4 19.1 2.1 100.00
Source: Eurostat
Unemployment‐related expenditure represents on average 2% of total public outlays, with a considerable variation
among Member States. The highest value is recorded in Germany (5%); new member countries, on the other hand,
generally spend less than 1%.
5. Concluding Remarks
Environmental policies in general, and climate change mitigation policy in particular, have not had much space in
public budgets. The share of environmental taxes out of total taxes has  generally decreased in recent years,
notwithstanding some recent novelties in CO2 taxation, and the potential to implement a complete environmental
tax reform in several Member States. In this context, however, a great impact can be expected from the third phase
of the European Trading Scheme, when almost  all allowances will be  auctioned by Member Countries. On the
expenditure side, the share of environmentally‐related public expenditure out of total expenditure is small in all
countries, but there is a general lack of transparency that makes an appraisal of this extremely difficult. The role and
49 Only collection of the first level of COFOG data is compulsory for Member States. This results in several missing data at
the second more detailed level.
trend of subsidies are even more controversial, also because a standard definition encompassing all aspects is still
absent. From an efficiency point of view, subsidies to fossil fuels should be eliminated and resources diverted to the
development and deployment of renewables.
Given that a consistent amount of resources have to be invested to implement the ambitious EU climate package,
new public funds need to be raised, but this requirement seems to be in conflict with the constraint imposed by
European coordination among Member States’ public finances. Public Finances in the EU are currently under stress
due to the recent financial crisis and to the long‐term effect of ageing populations on public budget balances. This
situation is exacerbated by the recent EUcouncil agreement, which committed to an increase in EU fiscal policy
credibility through supplementary public finance coordination and a strengthening of the European Stability Pact.
However, climate change must be faced squarely and directly and this need cannot be put aside by governments:
conciliation between financial stability and a climate package needs to be reached.
A “green golden rule”, under which climate‐change‐related investments would be irrelevant for the definition of
balances monitored by the European Stability Pact), may represent a reasonable way of dealing with both issues.
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Glossary
Environmental Taxes
An environmental tax is a tax whose tax base is a physical unit (or a proxy of it) that has a proven specific negative
impact on the environment. Following the Eurostat Statistical Guide on Environmental taxes, four subsets of
environmental taxes are distinguished with the relevant tax bases. Energy taxes include levies on energy products
used for both transport and stationary purposes, such as: Unleaded petrol, Leaded petrol, Diesel, Other energy
products for transport purposes (e.g. LPG or natural gas), Light fuel oil, Heavy fuel oil, Natural gas, Coal, Coke,
Biofuels, Other fuels for stationary use, Electricity consumption, Electricity production, District heat consumption,
District heat production. As a convention, CO2 taxes are also included here. Transport taxes are related to the
ownership and use of motor vehicles and can be levied on: Motor vehicles – one‐off import or sales taxes,
Registration or use of motor vehicles – recurrent (e.g. yearly) taxes. Resource taxes are related to the extraction and
the subsequent depletion of natural resources  and are charged on Water abstraction, Extraction of raw materials
(except oil and gas) and Other resources (e.g. forests). Pollution taxes are related to measured or estimated emissions
to air and water, the management of solid waste and noise. In some detail, they are levied on: Measured or
estimated NOx emissions, SO2content of fossil fuels, Other measured or estimated emissions to air, Ozone‐depleting
substances (e.g. CFC or halon), Measured or estimated effluents of oxydizeable matters (BOD, COD), Other measured
or estimated effluents to water, Effluent collection and treatment fixed annual taxes, Pesticides (based on e.g.
chemical content, price or volume), Artificial fertilisers (based  e.g. on phosphorus or nitrogen content or price),
Manure, Waste management in general (e.g. collection or treatment taxes), Waste management, individual products
(e.g. packaging, beverage containers), Noise (e.g. aircraft take‐off and landings). For further information, see the
Eurostat manual “Environmental Taxes ‐ A statistical guide”.
Implicit tax rate
The implicit tax rate, sometimes also referred to as an average or effective tax rate, is calculated by dividing the
revenues from taxes on a special activity or good by an appropriate corresponding aggregate tax base.
Tax expenditures
According to the IMF definition (the OECD one is similar) they are “revenues forgone as a result of selective
provisions in the tax code. Theymay include exemptions from the tax base, allowances deducted from gross income,
tax credits deducted  from tax liability, tax rate reductions, and tax deferrals (such as accelerated depreciation)”. For
further information, see the FMI “Manual on Fiscal Transparency 2007” (pag. 76) or the OECD “Journal on
Budgeting”, Vol IV, n. 1, 2004, (p. 130).
Direct taxes.
Taxes that are levied directly on personal or corporate incomes and property.
Indirect taxes
Taxes that are  levied during the production stage, and not on the income and property arising from economic
production processes. Prominent examples of indirect taxation are Value Added Tax (VAT), excise duties, import
levies, energy and other environmental taxes.
Excise duties.
Excise duties are indirect taxes on the consumption or the use of certain products. In contrast to Value Added Tax
(VAT), they are mainly specific taxes, i.e. expressed as a monetary amount per quantity of the product.
On‐budget subsidies
Interventions which appear as outlays in the general government balance sheet, like direct financial transfers (grants
to consumers/producers) or appropriations for energy‐related services directly undertaken by the government.
Energy‐related services provided directly
The definition (in table 3) covers a broad range of interventions where the General Government directly provides
services for the benefit of energy sectors: direct investments in energy specific infrastructures, energy‐related R&D
carried out in public (owned and  funded) centres of research, and services related to the provision of Liability
Insurance (in the case of nuclear plants) and facility decommissioning operations.
Off‐budget subsidies
Interventions not featuring in the balance sheet, like provision of tax expenditures (the revenues foregone can be
considered an implicit subsidy) or benefits originating from market regulation.
Budget balance
The balance between total public expenditure and revenue in a specific year, with a positive balance indicating a
surplus and a negative balance indicating a deficit. For the monitoring of Member State budgetary positions, the EU
uses a general government aggregate, which covers national government, regional and local government, as well as
social security funds; public enterprises are excluded, as are transfers to and from the EU Budget.
Primary budget balance
The budget balance net of interest payments on general government debt.
Structural budget balance
The actual budget balance net of the cyclical component and one‐off and other temporary measures. The structural
balance gives a measure of the underlying trend in the budget balance.
Cyclical component of budget balance
That part of the change in the budget balance that follows automatically from the cyclical conditions of the economy,
due to the reaction of public revenue and expenditure to changes in the output gap (i.e. the difference between
actual output and estimated potential output at any particular point in time). The potential output is the level of real
GDP in a given year that is consistent with a stable rate of inflation. If actual output rises above its potential level,
then constraints on capacity begin to bind and inflationary pressures build; if output falls below potential, then
resources are lying idle and  inflationary pressures abate. A method to estimate it is the production function
approach, based on available labour inputs, the capital stock and the level of efficiency.
One‐off and temporary measures
Government transactions having a transitory budgetary effect that do not lead to a sustained change in the
budgetary position.
Primary structural budget balance
The structural budget balance net of interest payments.
Fiscal effort
In general it is an intervention required to improve the budget position. In table 7 it represents the annual required
adjustment of the General Government Budget Balance ratio to GDP for the Maastricht reference value (deficit/GDP
equal to or less than the threshold of 3%) to be achieved by the countries currently under  the Excessive Deficit
Procedure.
Indicator S2
Broadly, the concept  of sustainability can be intuitively expressed as the ability of a government to assume the
financial burden of its debt currently and in the future, without the debt following an “explosive path”. Surveillance
of the sustainability of the Member States' budgets is one of the most important  tasks the European Commission
undertakes (it is essential for carrying out a common monetary policy) and for this purpose certain technical tools
are employed to assess States’  fiscal position. Among them, the S2 stability indicator shows the size of the
permanent adjustment to the structural primary balance required to fulfil the infinite horizon intertemporal budget
constraint, including paying for any additional expenditure arising from an ageing population.
Fulfilment of the infinite horizon intertemporal budget constraint implies that the discounted value of the future
structural primary balances should cover the current level of debt. Mathematically:
where
• is the last year before the long‐term projection;
• is the gross debt relative to GDP in t0 (the initial level);
• is the structural primary balance relative to GDP in t;
• r is the differential between the nominal interest rate (R) and the nominal GDP growth rate (G), that is
Given the initial level of debt, the assumption on the differential rate and  the projected path of the
structural primary, the condition (1) may not  hold, which means an uncontrolled evolution of debt. A
permanent adjustment (S2) in the structural primary balance is necessary to fulfil the constraint, so that the
condition (1) becomes:
and considering that S2 is constant and (3), with the discount rate strictly positive,
it follows that:
A final step is required to find out the different components of the indicator. Indeed each future structural
primary balance can be expressed as a change with respect to the initial one, that is
therefore:
where two components can be identified:
• the Initial Budgetary Position, corresponding to the gap between the
initial structural primary balance and the debt‐stabilising primary surplus.
• the Long‐Term Change in expenditure is the additional adjustment
required as a result of expenses arising especially from the ageing of
the population, so that  the magnitude of the LTC component depends on both the demographic
outlook for countries and their social protection arrangements.
For further information, see the European Commission “Sustainability Report 2009” or the European Central Bank
“Working Paper Series 2009 n. 944”.
